Kris Jenkins, best known for his buzzer-beater to win the 2016 NCAA men’s basketball championship for Villanova, is the latest former college athlete to sue the NCAA and major athletic conferences, alleging they unlawfully restricted his ability to monetize his name, image, and likeness (NIL) while playing under NCAA amateurism rules.
Filed earlier this month in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York, Jenkins’ 127-page complaint, brought by attorney Kevin Thomas Duffy, Jr., asserts claims under federal antitrust law and related equitable theories. Named defendants include the NCAA, the ACC, the Big Ten, the SEC, the Pac-12, and Big East. Jenkins contends that these entities conspired to enforce eligibility restrictions that constituted a group boycott and unreasonable restraint of trade, thereby violating Section 1 of the Sherman Act.
The suit stems from Jenkins’ collegiate career at Villanova (2013–2017), during which he was prohibited from engaging in NIL activity according to NCAA rules in place at the time. Although Jenkins qualified as a class member in the proposed House v. NCAA settlement, covering Division I athletes from June 15, 2016, onward, he opted out to preserve his individual claims. His legal theory closely tracks the antitrust arguments that have become increasingly prominent in the wake of O’Bannon v. NCAA and NCAA v. Alston.
Growing Wave of Former Athletes Challenging NCAA
Jenkins is among a growing group of former athletes, including Mario Chalmers, Reggie Bush, and several members of NC State’s 1983 championship team, challenging the NCAA’s historical NIL restrictions. Collectively, these cases argue that eligibility rules operated as horizontal agreements among member institutions to suppress the value of athletes’ publicity rights, a form of commercial exploitation prohibited under antitrust doctrine.
A key aspect of Jenkins’ claim involves the right of publicity, which protects individuals from unauthorized commercial use of their identity. The complaint asserts that NCAA policies deprived Jenkins of this right and caused economic harm, particularly as he was a high-profile athlete with substantial marketability following his championship-winning shot in 2016. Unlike some other former college athletes, Jenkins never reached the NBA, rendering the lost NIL opportunities during college even more consequential.
Legal Hurdles and the NCAA’s Expected Defense
The NCAA is expected to mount several defenses, chief among them is a statute of limitations argument. Federal antitrust claims are generally subject to a four-year limitation period, and unjust enrichment claims are typically governed by shorter state-law periods. Since Jenkins last played in 2017, the NCAA will likely argue that his claims are time-barred. Jenkins may respond by invoking tolling doctrines, arguing that the continuing commercial use of his NIL, such as on conference websites and social media, extends the actionable period. Additionally, his inclusion in the House class (certified in 2023) may serve as a basis for equitable tolling or relation back.
Another expected defense relates to precedent on athlete compensation for broadcast appearances. In Marshall v. ESPN (6th Cir. 2016), the court rejected claims that college athletes were entitled to compensation for their televised performances. While Marshall is not binding on the Second Circuit, the NCAA will likely argue it is persuasive authority. Jenkins, in turn, may point to the NCAA’s willingness to settle House for approximately $2.8 billion as indicative of the legitimacy of NIL-based compensation claims. However, as a matter of law, settlements are not precedential, and Jenkins’ decision to opt out may undercut any inference that the NCAA admitted liability.
Finally, the NCAA will likely argue that Jenkins voluntarily agreed to abide by its eligibility rules, a defense that courts have partially credited in prior cases such as O’Bannon and Alston, particularly where the restrictions were found to be related to the purported educational value of amateur athletics.
Conclusion
While Jenkins presents a sympathetic narrative and a potentially persuasive antitrust theory, his claims face significant legal obstacles, both procedural and substantive. The outcome of this case may turn on how courts continue to interpret the intersection of antitrust law, amateurism, and the evolving legal treatment of athlete NIL rights.